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INTRODUCTION
On March 6, 1975, the Persian Gulf states of Iran and Iraq
peacefully settled a long standing dispute which had twice brought
them to the brink of war. The terms of the agreement, Iraqi recog-
nition of the Iranian right of free passage on the Shatt-al-Arab
in return for the withdrawal of Iranian support for the Kurdish
rebellion in northern Iraq, removed the greatest source of ten-
sion in the northern Gulf and offered new hope for the ultimate
2
stability of the region. This settlement was quickly followed
by public statements from both sides calling for the establishment
of regional security structures to eliminate foreign military
3
alliances and interference. Although the settlement was peaceful,
the events leading up to it were anything but. Both sides had
developed extensive military capabilities and were on the verge of
testing them firmly against one another when the situation was
defused. It is the development of these capabilities and their
effect on the politics of the Persian Gulf which is the subject of
this paper.
The paper focuses on the three largest of the littoral Gulf
states, Iran, Iraq, and Saudi Arabia. By virtue of its early (1965)
reorientation of security policy towards the Gulf, Iran has been
well ahead of its neighbors in being able to define its military
4
requirements. Iran's government, in the person of the Shah, has
planned since the 1960s for the assumption of Britain's role as
guarantor of Gulf stability, and has earnestly pursued this policy

by developing an extensive military capability. While trying to
formulate Gulf-oriented security plans, Iraq has been hampered by
active security threats in the form of the Kurdish rebellion and
periodic war with the state of Israel, but has still been able to
develop a military capability nearly as broad as that of her
neighbor, Iran. Saudi Arabia, on the other hand, has only since
1973 placed significant emphasis on attaining a broader military
capability as support for its assumption of a wider role in Gulf
affairs
.
The first section of the paper consists of a detailed
analysis of the development of the military capabilities of the
three states. It should be noted that the emphasis is on capability,
i.e., the physical capacity in terms of equipment and manpower nec-
essary for warfare, not on effective military strength. As was
learned in the 1967 Six-Day War, mere possession of technologically
6
sophisticated weapons does not ensure victory. Though each of the
three states possesses some of the most technologically advanced
weapons available, serious doubts exist as to their ability to
utilize effectively the full capabilities of the weapons. The
second section of the paper will study the role of these capabil-
ities in regional politics, while the third will analyze their role
in the domestic political stability of the three states.

CHAPTER
DEVELOPMENT OF A MILITARY CAPABILITY
Iran
During the first two decades following World War II, Iran's
military posture was determined largely by the threat of attack from
7
the Soviet Union. After its experience with the Soviets in the
province of Azerbaijan in 1945-46, Iran had valid reasons to regard
the Soviet Union as a threat to its national security. Heartened by
the decisive support of the United States in 1947, the Iranian
government refused to ratify the oil concession to the Soviet-
Iranian Oil Company which had been worked out as a precondition
8
for Soviet withdrawal from Azerbaijan. The resulting furor in the
Soviet Union, including such statements as "Russia would consider
9
Iran a bitter blood enemy," sharpened Iran's perception of a secu-
rity threat from her northern neighbor. Although actual military
aid from the United States was slow in developing because of U.S.
uncertainty about Iranian domestic stability, by April 1955, when
Iran joined the Baghdad pact the arms had started to flow in signi-
10
ficant quantities. During the next decade Iran enjoyed a high
priority for U.S. military aid. As a member of the Central Treaty
Organization (CENTO) and regarded by the U.S. as a forward defense
area, Iran received substantial amounts of military equipment and
. .
11
training. Although the U.S. didn't anticipate Iran's being a

primary Soviet invasion target, the bulk of the U.S. /Iranian




Since the basic tenet of CENTO was a mutual assistance pact
in which the signatory countries would come to one another's aid
in the event of Soviet aggression, a larger Iranian inventory of
arms was not deemed necessary. Additionally, on March 5, 1959,
Iran and the United States signed a bilateral agreement in which
the U.S. "promised to provide assistance, including the use of armed
forces, as might be requested and mutually agreed upon, subject to
13
the United States Constitution." With these agreements in force
Iran was not expected to withstand a Soviet invasion alone, merely
to fight a delaying action until help could arrive.
The major items of military equipment transferred to Iran
from the U.S. during this period reflect this preoccupation with
the Soviet threat. Approximately 215 main battle tanks (M-47
Pattons and older Shermans) , 50 M-24 Chaffee lightweight tanks,
75 F-84G subsonic jet aircraft and medium range transport aircraft
14
were transferred to Iran from the U.S. between 19 51 and 1964.
Although Iran was a member of the Western alliance and had
assurances of military aid from the U.S., the events of the early
1960s disillusioned Iran's leader, Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlavi.
During the 1962 Cuban missile crisis he became uneasy that
Washington-made unilateral decisions might involve Iran in a confla-
15
gration against her will. Likewise, he became dissatisfied with
CENTO in the wake of the refusal of its members to come to the aid
16
of Pakistan during the India-Pakistan crisis of 1965. Important
as these two factors were, they were overshadowed somewhat by the
growing Iranian fear of Arab nationalism. The existence of a

nationalist regime in Iraq under left wing military rule had created
a tense situation along Iran's western border and Egypt's Gamal
Abdul Nasser was applying pressure against the Arab monarchies of
the Gulf. The combination of Egyptian military activity in Yemen
and a possible British withdrawal from Aden convinced the Shah that
the primary threat to his country lay from the south, not the north.
With these events in mind he began to pursue a more neutralist
approach to foreign policy and strengthened his ties with the Soviet
17
Union.
After a significant lessening of tensions with the Soviet
Union and in response to his dissatisfaction with CENTO, the Shah
declared in March 1965 that henceforth Iran's military prepara-
18
tions would be focused on the Persian Gulf. Even before the
declaration, however, the Shah had given notice to the West of his
altered security perspective by his 1964 request for an air defense
system to protect the oil loading installations on Kharg Island in
19
the Persian Gulf and the oil refinery at Abadan. This request
reflected the Iranian awareness of the vulnerability of these vital
installations (some of the most sensitive of which are nearly
within bazooka range of the international boundary) , especially in
view of the decades old border dispute with Iraq over the boundary
20
. .
and transit rights on the Shatt-al-Arab . As a more recent stimi-
lus , the Iraqis had received Soviet-built MIG-21 Fishbed fighters
21
to support their TU-16 Badger bomber aircraft in 1964, which
provided a formidable threat to those installations. Although the
American-built F-84 subsonic fighters of the Imperial Iranian Air
Force could be effective against the subsonic TU-16s, they would be
ineffective in combat against the supersonic MIG-21s. The request
for an air defense system consisting of 91 F-5s and a number of Hawk

surface to air missile (SAM) batteries demonstrated the Iranian
22
concern for this threat. Because this was the first arms transfer
to Iran which reflected the realignment of its security priorities,
Table 1* (Iranian Arms Acquisition 1965-1976) , begins with this
transfer.
Another factor contributing to the disillusionment of the
Shah was the initial American reluctance to supply the HAWKs and
F-5s on the grounds that the expenditure would put a strain on the
23
Iranian economy. In an attempt to lessen his dependence on U.S.
arms and to diversify his arms purchases, the Shah opened negotia-
tions for Soviet military equipment in July 1966, completing a
$110 million arms deal for "unsophisticated" equipment in February
24
1967. Also in 1966, in a further attempt at diversification,
Iran turned to Great Britain for purchase of naval equipment
including one BATTLE class destroyer (ex-Royal Navy) and four SAAM
class corvettes (new construction) to be fitted with Seacat SAM
25
and Sea Killer surface to surface missiles (SSM) . Although these
purchases can be seen as gestures of independence, it seems clear
that since the Shah was holding concurrent negotiations with the
U.S. for the technologically superior F-4 Phantom multi-mission
aircraft, they were also designed to weaken American resistance to
26
the sale of advanced equipment to Iran. "He [the Shah] made it
abundantly clear also that if the United States is unwilling or
unable to meet his major military requirements he is determined to
27
go elsewhere to acquire what he needs." The September, 1966,
agreement to supply 30 F-4s (Table 1) must be viewed in this context,
however, this did not mean that the U.S. lost all control over
*A11 tables appear in the Appendix.

Iranian arms purchases. For example, when Iran later expressed
interest in the Soviet SA-2 Guideline SAM, the U.S. forced Iran to
choose between the SA-2 and the F-4, stating that Iran could not
28
have both. In the midst of such flirtations with Soviet arms, the
Shah added pressure on the U.S. by making a veiled threat to the
effect that Iran might be forced to make bilateral agreements with
29
her "friends and neighbors" if CENTO proved valueless. The view
that the Soviet agreement was completed merely in order to gain
leverage in U.S. arms negotiations is given credence by the fact
that there have been no subsequent Soviet arms agreements. For
example, in 19 70, when the Soviet Union offered to sell Iran virtu-
ally any type of military aircraft it wanted, Iran refused the offer,
preferring to keep the U.S. as its primary arms supplier despite the
30
higher prices of U.S. arms.
The aggressiveness with which the Iranians pursued arms
negotiations after 1965 gave good indications of their perceptions
of the realities of stability in the Persian Gulf. In private con-
versations with Dr. Alvin J. Cottrell about this time, the Shah
indicated that in his opinion, the British decision to withdraw from
31
Aden presaged a more general departure from the Persian Gulf. The
1966 contracts for five major naval vessels fitted with offensive
missiles, together with the F-4 acquisitions provide concrete
evidence of the Shah's intention to prepare militarily for an
eventual British withdrawal from the Gulf. Following the January,
1968, British announcement of impending withdrawal, the Shah stated
his policy publicly:
We have to develop such a potential to keep this area secure
after the British leave. Iran can do it because we have no
territorial or colonial designs. Iran's role in the Persian

Gulf is to present the image of strength, wisdom, and absolutely-
altruistic purposes, and yet, without any thought of trying to
32play Big Daddy.
In support of this policy Iran continued developing a power-
ful, well-balanced military capability. Since the air force had
begun receiving the long range, all-weather Mach 2+ tactical F-4
33
Phantom aircraft in 1968 and already had possession of the F-5,
the Iranian air capability was well established. The naval offense
rested with the acquisition of the surface to surface missile frig-
ates, supported by two refitted U.S. Navy destroyers (Table 1), It
was in the critical area of projection of troop strength beyond the
borders of Iran that the Shah made the most substantial equipment
acquisitions during this period. From 1967 to 1971 Iran increased
the size of its helicopter fleet by ordering 140 American-designed,
Italian built AB 205 and 206As , 16 French SA 321 Super Frelons and
34
22 American- designed, Italian-built CH-47 helicopters. To support
this air transport capability, Iran ordered fourteen naval hover-
craft to be used for surface-borne troop transport and coastal
patrol, which gave it the largest operational hovercraft fleet in
35
the world. For longer distance transport operations Iran
increased its fleet of C-130 heavy-lift transport aircraft from
eight in 1963 to a total of 56 on order by December 1970 (Table 1)
.
In the years immediately following the British withdrawal,
Iran continued to contract for weapon systems intended to reinforce
its self-defined role of guarantor of regional stability. Although
the largest purchase was the initial order of 800 Chieftain main
36
battle tanks from Britain in 1971 (Table 1) , more significant
orders were placed. The 1972 acquisition of line of sight, wire-
37
guided TOW anti-tank missiles added a new level of battlefield

technology to the Iranian ground forces, and the 1972 contract for
six Boeing 707-320 tanker aircraft (Table 1) greatly increased the
range of the growing fleet of F-4 and F-5 tactical aircraft. Also
in 1972, Iran contracted for six P-3 Orion ocean surveillance air-
38
craft (Table I) , which have a mission radius of over 1500 miles.
The reasons for the acquisition of this long-range aerial capa-
bility were allude to in a March 1971 interview with the Shah.
It was the Shah's belief that an energetic foreign policy would have
to encompass much of the Indian Ocean since Iran's "lifeline" passed
through this area. He mentioned the need for larger naval forces
"including perhaps a helicopter carrier somewhat similar to the
39
MOSKVA class of the Soviets." By 19 74 Iran was acknowledged to
be aiming for a patrol capability as far as 10 degrees South lati-
tude, which is about the latitude of the American base at Diego
40
Garcia.
Although as of this writing the Shah's specific desire for
a helicopter carrier has not been translated into a naval contract,
he did in 1974 contract with Litton Industries of the United States
41
for six of the new light cruiser-size SPRUANCE class destroyers.
For support of his growing fleet the Shah ordered three new construc-
tion fleet supply ships from West Germany in 1972 (Table 1) . Each
42
of these ships carries fuel, armament, and general stores which
increases both the patrol range and on station time of the
destroyers and frigates of the Iranian navy. The 1975 purchase of
43
three ex-U.S. Navy TANG class diesel submarines added an entirely
new dimension to Iran's expanding naval forces. Since none of the
Persian Gulf states possess naval vessels large enough to warrant
submarine opposition, and since the Gulf is fairly shallow, the sub-
marines must be intended for protection of the sea lanes in the

10
Indian Ocean. In 1975 Iranian military officers verified this
contention by describing Iran's intention to patrol the northern
44
reaches of the Indian Ocean.
After 1972, the technical complexity of the Iranian arsenal
increased dramatically as a result of two unrelated circumstances.
In a May 1972, state visit to Iran, then-President Nixon, in consul-
tation with his national security adviser Henry Kissinger, informed
the Shah that the U.S. would sell to Iran any conventional weapon
system that Iran wanted to procure, including either the F-14 or
45
F-15 advanced air superiority jet fighter aircraft. When Iran
began receiving increased revenue from the jump in oil prices in
late 197 3, the Shah had both the financial resources and official
U.S. permission for access to the most advanced U.S. military tech-
nology. Some of the results of this combination of factors can be
seen in Table 1. In 1974 alone, Iran signed contracts with the
United States for the following: 80 F-14A Tomcat Mach 2+ inter-
ceptor aircraft, which is a significant technological advance over
46
both the F-4 and "the latest Soviet combat aircraft"; 222 RGM Har-
47
poon SSM, to be fitted onto the Iranian hovercraft and which can
48
be fired from the P-3 Orion aircraft; laser-guided bombs; six
SPRUANCE class destroyers; six batteries of HAWK improved SAM; 424
Phoenix air to air missiles, for use on the F-14 and which have a
49
proven range of at least 68 nautical miles; 634 shoulder-fired
Dragon anti-tank missiles; 2850 Maverick television-guided air to
surface missiles; more TOW anti-tank missiles, bringing the total
inventory to 6700 missiles; 36 F-4E fighter bomber aircraft; and six
KC-135 tanker aircraft (Table 1) . These quantum leaps in technology
were continued in 1975 with the acquisition of three submarines, 1200
Chieftain main battle tanks, advanced F-5F tactical fighter bomber
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aircraft and intelligence collection systems. In 1976 this pattern
continued with the addition of RH-53D minesweeping helicopters, F-15
advanced air superiority fighter aircraft, F-16 lightweight fighter
aircraft, and the Standard SAM to be fitted onto Iran's DD-710 class
destroyers (Table 1) . Iran is being provided with a varied and
potent offensive capability, one which can respond to numerous kinds
of threats.
Although Iran is in the process of taking delivery on these
50
systems, serious doubts exist as to whether or not the Iranians
are capable of fully utilizing the technology their government has
purchased. Like the other Gulf states, Iran has historically been a
non-industrial nation and despite serious attempts at rapid moderni-
zation in recent years, it possesses no widebased technological
sophistication among its general population. For example, in order
to provide proper maintenance for the advance technology systems such
as the F-14, a fledgling mechanical pool might be taught basic repair
functions before it can be trained to handle the much more compli-
cated and exacting requirements of state-of-the art avionics. As one
interested observer of Gulf affairs put it, their basis for techno-
logical receptability is quite low simply because "they didn't tinker
51
with machinery as children." A senior U.S. naval aviator agreed
with that assessment by saying that their lack of technological
familiarity in the formative years can be viewed as one reason for
the difficulty experienced by many foreign aviation students in U.S.
Navy training programs in adjusting to the high level of co-ordinated
52
relative motion awareness and technical expertise required for flight.
Another major problem for Iran and the other Gulf states
is the lack of an industrial infrastructure. Because of this
problem, if no spare parts are available in the country, the

12
non-functioning system must be shipped back to the factory for
repairs. The government of Iran is aware of this limitation and is
attempting to develop the necessary industrial infrastructure
through such means as a $255 million contract with Bell Helicopter
Company to train 1500 helicopter pilots and 5000 mechanics in Iran,
while developing a complete maintenance and logistics support system
53
for the aviation branch of the Iranian army, a $25 million con-
tract with Hughes Aircraft to build an electro-optics plant in
Shiraz, where they hope to develop an electronics industry with
54
exportable technology, a contract with Grumman Corporation for
. .
55
training and support of the F-14 in Esfahan, and the pending con-
tract with West Germany for assembly of the Leopard main battle
56
tank. The U.S. government, in support of this concerted Iranian
effort to build up a viable technological base, has approved copro-
duction agreements for helicopters, anti-tank and air to surface
57
missiles which will be assembled in Iran. Finally, in an attempt
to improve the vitally important logistics support capability of the
armed forces, Iran has recently signed a contract with Lockheed Air
Services for the organization of a supply and logistics tracking
58
system called Peace Log. Through efforts such as these, Iran's
military is trying to rapidly overcome its non-technological handi-
cap. It is recognized, however, that without substantial support
from foreign technicians, the Iranians have little hope of
59
maintaining their armed forces for "at least a decade or more. It
has been reported to Congress that due to heavy Iranian dependence
on U.S. technological assistance, it is unlikely that Iran could go






Although Iran has vastly expanded its conventional military
capability during the last decade, it has yet to acquire a nuclear
military capability. Unlike Iraq, it has not acquired nuclear
capable missiles (see Iraqi discussion below) , however, it is
quickly entering into the field of nuclear technology. In May 1976
Iran purchased two nuclear reactors from France as the initial
acquisitions in an ambitious nuclear power program. When the
Iranian prime minister was asked if the order included construc-
tion of a fuels processing plant, which is critical to any nuclear
weapons program, he replied that the agreement covered "the whole
gamut of nuclear technologies." It was reported, however, that the
value of the contract, $1.2 billion, was not considered sufficient
61
to cover the cost of a reprocessing plant* Iran quickly followed
up this purchase with a West German deal for two 1200 megawatt
nuclear power plants at a total cost of $4.4 billion, which included
a ten year supply of nuclear fuel. At the time of the contract,
Akbar Etemad, the Iranian atomic energy president, said his country
62
did not yet need a nuclear fuel reprocessing capability. Whether
or not Iran will need or want it in the future is, as yet, undeter-
mined. It is due partly to this question that negotiations with the
U.S. government have stalled over the Iranian purchase of up to nine
63
additional nuclear reactors. The speed and energy with which Iran
is pursuing its nuclear program is raising questions regarding its
ultimate intentions. Given the potential instability of the region,
the continuing Irano-Iraqi arms race, and the Shah's expressed
intention to act as guarantor of peace and stability for the other
Gulf states, it is very likely that the Iranian decision to acquire
nuclear weapons may not be too far in the future, if, indeed, it has
not already been made.

14
It has been reported that because of the priority assigned
to the "prestige" purchases, such as the F-14, already-trained per-
sonnel have been transferred to these new systems with a resultant
64
degradation of overall military effectiveness. This is signifi-
cant because rather that having one completely operational system
(F-4 or F-5) while personnel are undergoing training on the new
system, Iran is faced with the problem of having all the systems
involved operating at a reduced capability while the personnel learn
their new jobs.
Iraq
Prior to the July 19 58 overthrow of the Iraqi monarchy, the
country's military ties were close enough to the Western powers for
its armed forces to be considered little more than appendages of the
65
British military stationed in the area. The prevailing anti-
Soviet orientation of the West in this period attracted monarchial
Iraq because that country, like Iran, had experienced problems with
its northern neighbor. In 1946 the Soviet Union provided sanctuary
for rebellious Iraqi Kurds, who remained under Soviet protection
within its borders for the next thirteen years. Following this epi-
sode, Iraq adopted a severe anti-Communist stance in both her inter-
nal and external policies. Within Iraq the monarchy carried out
an effective purge of the Communist party between 1947 and 1949
66
which decimated the membership and paralyzed its leadership. Even
though Iraq had adopted such a hard-line stance towards the Commu-
nists, as late as 1953 its government still experienced difficulty
in obtaining all the military aid it desired from Great Britain.
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As an inducement for Iraq to join in a regional defense
system, the United States signed a military assistance agreement
67
in Aprxl 1954. In January of the following year Iraq severed
diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union and the following month
. .
68joined with Turkey in the Baghdad Pact. They were joined later
in the year by Iran, Pakistan, and Great Britain.
Although the military assistance pact had been signed with
the United States, from 1955 to 1958 Iraq received the majority of
her military support from Great Britain. In this period the U.S.
provided five subsonic F-86 Sabre jet fighters and 40 M-24 light
tanks, but Britain handed over approximately 90 Centurion main
battle/tanks, 30 fighter and fighter bomber aircraft (Hawker-Hunter
69
MK 6s and DeHaviland Venoms) plus three transport aircraft.
Following the 1958 revolution, Iraq's military orientation
was abruptly shifted from an anti-Soviet posture to a generally
pro-Soviet one. Although the official Iraqi policy was one of non-
alignment it quickly established friendly relations with much of the
Communist world, withdrawing from the Baghdad Pact in March 1959.
The Soviet Union capitalized on the Western reluctance to continue
supplying arms and training and negotiated and arms-trade agreement
70
which solidly established Iraq as a Soviet weapons client. It is
interesting to note that this first substantial arms agreement
altered the existing balance of military power between Iraq and her
former treaty ally, Iran, and played a major role in the outbreak
of the Shatt-al-Arab crisis in 1959. The arms supplied, about
45 subsonic jet fighters, trainers and transport aircraft, 125 T-54
and older T-34 main battle tanks, and two 50 ton P-6 class motor
71
torpedo boats, began to give Iraq a military capability which was
superior to Iran's. This pact also established Soviet military

16
training and assistance teams in Baghdad and provided for the
training of Iraqi military cadets in the Soviet Union.
In the following years as Iraq has attempted to maintain its
neutralist approach to foreign policy, it has concluded a number of
arms agreements with both the United Kingdom and France, but for
the most part, the country has remained a Soviet arms client. In
1960 the revolutionary government stepped back slightly from its
close alignment with the Soviet Union and concluded an agreement
with the British for a few DH Vampire training aircraft. The same
year, however, the Soviet Union provided Iraq with more advanced
MIG 17D and MIG 19 fighter aircraft, four more P-6 torpedo boats,
29 T-54 tanks, about 25 JS III main battle tanks and some BTR-152
72
armoured personnel carriers (totaling 200 by 1962) . The level
of Soviet arms aid in relation to that of Great Britain clearly
indicates the continuing domination of Soviet assistance.
A major factor affecting the Iraqi requests for arms was the
beginning of the Kurdish rebellion in Northern Iraq. Although the
Soviet Union generally supported the aims of the Kurdish rebellion
73
because of its possible weakening effect on the CENTO alliance,
it continued its strong military support of the Iraqi central gov-
ernment. The Soviet transfers of MI-1 and AN-12 military helicop-
74
ters which occurred during the same period can be viewed as
responses to an Iraqi requirement to be able to accurately deploy
forces against Kurdish strongholds. The 1962 delivery of TU-16
Badger jet bomber aircraft was the first quantum improvement in
Iraqi military capability. The aircraft could deliver 19,800 pounds
75
of bombs against the Kurds, but its 3900 mile range also enabled
it to reach any point in the Persian Gulf area. Because of this
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significant ability it is with this transfer that Table 2 ( Iraqi
Arms Acquisitions/Contracts 196 2-76 ) begins.
The February 1963 Ba'athist coup precipitated a temporary
halt in Soviet military aid to Iraq. As the new government carried
out a purge of Iraqi communists, the Soviets withdrew their advisors
and suspended their agreements , creating a lack of spare parts for
the Soviet-made weapons and shortages of ammunition which in turn
caused a slow-down in the prosecution of the war against the
76
Kurds. To remedy the situation Iraq turned to Britain and began
negotiations which culminated in agreements (between 1964 and 1966)
for 59 Hawker-Hunter fighter, fighter/ground attack, and trainer
77
aircraft, about 100 Saracen APCs and 20 Jet Provost aircraft.
Additionally, agreements were reached on the supply of artillery
ammunition and the training of air force cadets who were withdrawn
78
from the Soviet Union and sent to Britain. The weapons which were
obtained from Britain during this period, as with the TU-16 transfer,
were weapons which could be used both against the Kurds and in a
Persian Gulf role. For example, the Jet Provost aircraft are light
79
strike aircraft which in a ground support role should be effective
against the exposed oil facilities at Abadan.
When the Ba'athists were removed from power by another mili-
tary coup late in 1963, relations with the Soviet Union thawed some-
what and Iraq reopened arms negotiations with the Soviets in 1964.
80 ....
The agreement reached in June 1964 is significant in several res-
pects. First it provided the needed spare parts for the Soviet
equipment idled by the previous withdrawal of Soviet support.
Second, in addition to the supply of more heavy and light tanks,
automatic weapons, and ammunition, it provided for the establishment
of five arms and ammunition factories in Iraq. These factories
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could provide a degree of autonomy in and shorten the time required
for future rearming and ammunition resupply efforts for the Iraqi
military. The most significant aspect of the agreement, however,
was the 1964 transfer of 12 MIG-21 supersonic, short-range fighter
aircraft to Iraq. The transfer of these aircraft provided weight
for the subsequent Iranian request for F-5 fighters and HAWK SAM
and can be regarded as one of the initial steps in the burgeoning
Iraqi/Iranian arms race.
The MIG-21 at that time was a front-line Soviet jet fighter.
Although its short combat radius of 348 miles placed some limita-
tions on its usefulness as a Persian Gulf weapon, its Mach 1.5 speed
and air to air combat capabilities were decidedly superior to the
81
second rate F-84s of the Iranian air force. The aircraft's short
range would not be a handicap if the target was the Abadan oil com-
plex, a fact apparently well appreciated by the Iranians. The
supply of the MIG-21s also for the first time gave Iraq an effective
escort aircraft for its TU-16 bombers on short missions. In this
regard it must be noted that Iraq did not receive and currently does
82
not possess an indigenous aerial refueling capability. This fact
continually limits the Iraqi MIG-21 fleet to short range combat
operations.
These Soviet arms transfers should not only be viewed vis a
vis the Iranians, however. Since the formation of the state of
Israel, Iraq has expressed strong anti-Zionist sentiments and has
83
supported the Arab efforts against that state. The degree to
which another conflict with Israel was considered in the 1964 arms
agreement is open to speculation, but it can be reasoned that it
played at least some part in the motivation for the extensive arms
contract. Between the signing of the agreement and the outbreak of

19
the Six Day War in 1967, Iraq received shipment of a total of
60 MIG-21s, placing the size of its air force second only to Egypt
84
in the Arab world. Although Iraq did not participate very heavily
in the war it loaned some of its aircraft to Jordan and lost a total
85
of 28 aircraft to Israeli action.
One of the results of the war was an intensification of the
contacts with the Soviet Union. Less than a month after the Israeli
victory the President of the Soviet Union visited Baghdad to reaf-
86
firm these contacts and to promise more Soviet aid and arms. The
transfer of 2 TU-16s, 10 MIG-21s, 20 SU-7s, and 12 MIG-17/19s can be
viewed as the tangible expression of this Soviet verbal support
>
87(Table II). Despite this, another result was the Iraqi desire
for more diversification of their sources for military equipment
which can be seen by the Iraqi military shopping expeditions to
Paris in late 1967 and early 1968. These expeditions resulted in
the announcement of pending agreements for 70 French AMX-30 main
88
battle tanks and 52 Mirage V fighter aircraft. Although these
negotiations were suspended after the successive coups during July
1968, a deal was consumated for 70 AML-90 armoured cars and 12
Alouette III helicopters which, in the military version, were
89
designed to be weapons carrying attack helicopters.
Of the three factors mentioned above affecting the Iraqi
demand for weapons during the 1960s, i.e., the prosecution of the
Kurdish War, the anti-Israeli struggles and the anti-Iranian/Persian
Gulf interest, the Kurdish factor had the greatest import. Despite
periodic truces with the rebels, the central government had waged
more or less continuous war against them throughout the decade.
This became a point of increasing irritation to the Soviet Union and
Iran both of which supported the Kurds. As the decade came to a
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close, though, the dispute between Iraq and Iran began to assume
greater significance. The resurgence of the Shatt-al-Arab contro-
versy in 1969 and the realization that because of the Kurdish prob-
lem it could not assist the Arabs in a war with Israel forced Iraq
to stabilize its domestic political situation in order to be able
90
to present a more concentrated effort towards its foreign policy.
The March 1970 peace settlement with the Kurds allowed the govern-
ment of Iraq to shift its primary focus to the external problems
it faced. The arms acquisitions which followed indicate a large
expansion of the capabilities of the Iraqi army. Between 1969
and 1971 Iraq received 500 T-54 and newer T-55 main battle tanks
and 45 PT-76 light tanks (Table 2) while expanding its army from
70,000 men with one armoured division to 85,000 men with four
91
armoured divisions. The Iraqis also increased the mobility of
their army by the acquisition of 27 MI-4 and MI-8 military heli-
copters .
The close military ties Iraq had with the Soviet Union were
dramatically strengthened by the April 1972 signing of a fifteen
year treaty of friendship and cooperation between Iraq and the
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Soviet Union. The military aid Iraq received following the sign-
ing of this agreement was substantial: 130 T-34, T-54 and T-55 main
battle tanks, 300 BTR-152 armoured personnel carriers, 400 artillery
pieces and anti-aircraft guns, 20 MIG-21s, 12 SU-7s, SA-3 GOA SAM,
and, most significantly, 3 OSA class Fast Patrol Boats (FPB) armed
with STYX surface to surface missiles (Table 2). The introduction
of the OSA FPBs into the Iraqi navy was the first attempt to counter
the growing Iranian naval capability. In January 1972 a party of
Swiss and American journalists had reported the Iranian navy to be
93
the Persian Gulf's most efficient and powerful local naval force.
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The Iraqi recognition of their inability to oppose the Iranians at
sea can be viewed as the primary reason for the acquisition of the
26 nautical mile STYX missile, the effectiveness of which had been




Significant as these transfers were in diversifying the
Iraqi military capability, it was not until after the 1973 war with
Israel that the military technology being acquired by Iraq experi-
enced qualitative advancements similar to those which Iran had been
experiencing during the previous few years. The beginning of this
process was the introduction of TU-22 Blinder supersonic bombers in
October 1973 (Table 2) . Although these aircraft have a shorter
range than the older TU-16s (1400 miles to 3900 miles), their speed
(800 knots to 510 knots) provides a significant increase in combat
95 ...
capability. The Soviet Union reportedly maintained tight control
96
over these aircraft by providing Soviet pilots, but Iraqis were
97
seen in the Soviet Union learning how to fly and maintain them.
As the war against the Kurds flared up again during 1973 and 1974
98
and tensions with Iran mounted over the conflict, Iraq requested
and the Soviet Union supplied other technologically advanced weapons
In addition to the TU-22 and a resupply of the SA-3 GOA SAM, Iraq
acquired SA-6 SAM, SA-7 SAM, MIG-23 fighter bomber aircraft and the
FROG surface to surface missile (Table 2) . The new acquisitions
provided a mix of mobile high altitude (SA-6) and low altitude
(SA-3) missiles supplemented by highly mobile shoulder fired short
range SA-7s and was a Soviet attempt to provide an integrated air
defense capability similar to the one which had proven so effective
99
for the Egyptians in the Yom Kippur War. The most immediately
significant weapon placed at Iraq's disposal was undoubtedly the
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MIG-23 aircraft. These variable geometry wing, Mach 2.8 fighters
were operated by the Soviets, who, as in the case of the TU-2 2s,
provided both pilots and maintenance personnel, though in this case
there were no reports of Iraqis in training for operation or main-
100
tenance of the aircraft. The acquisition of such a highly
sophisticated airplane must be viewed as a response to the pending
Iranian purchase of the F-14„ From a different perspective, however,
the most significant Iraqi purchase was the long range (4 to 50
,
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nautical mile) FROG SSM. This weapon was supplemented in
February 1975 by the 70 nautical mile range SCUD SSM, which are
102
reportedly being operated by Soviet technicians. Although the
older unguided, spin-stabilized FROGs and the more accurate SCUD
guided missiles are reported to be armed with conventional war-
10 3
heads, Jane's All The World's Aircraft lists both weapons as
104
capable of carrying nuclear warheads. Though the weapons are
formidable with conventional high explosive warheads, the fact that
they are nuclear capable makes them potentially devastating and
ushers in the first nuclear-associated weapon technology to the
Persian Gulf states
.
Since 1968 Iraq has been operating a small atomic reactor
10 5
provided by the Soviet Union in Baghdad and m September 1975,
announced a nuclear cooperation agreement with France. This agree-
ment, which came after Iraqi Vice-President Saddam Hussain had
viewed the Phoenix fast-breeder experimental reactor, reportedly
includes terms for the purchase of a French nuclear reactor and sev-
eral light water units. There were no reports of a nuclear fuels
reprocessing plant, however. Even though Iraq does not currently
possess the capability to produce nuclear weapons, its expanding
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nuclear energy program plus its possession of nuclear capable
missiles raises the question of its ultimate intention.
Despite beliefs in late 1975 and early 1976 that the Iraqi-
Irano rapproachement might be an attempt by Iraq to place some dis-
tance between itself and the Soviet Union, there are published
reports that a significant and comprehensive military assistance
treaty was signed between Iraq and the Soviet Union in August
10 7
19 76. The Iranian newspaper Kayhan International reported that
a $3 billion agreement had been signed which included the techno-
logically sophisticated weapons listed in Table 2. Partial sub-
stantiation of the arms deal has been received from a November 5,
1976, Associated Press story quoting the Arab weekly magazine Events
This report put the amount of the arms deal at $4 billion, and it
reportedly included the following: 138 MIG-23s, a squadron of
MIG-25s, several batteries of SCUD/Scalebird SSM, several hundred
T-62 and T-64 tanks, seven naval frigates, six submarines, numerous
108
missile carrying gunboats, APCs and artillery. Although the
overall cost, some of the weapons and the quantities differ, it can
be concluded from these reports that some sort of a substantial arms
contract has been signed; one which both qualitatively and quanti-
tively increases the capabilities of each component of the Iraqi
armed forces. It only a portion of the weapons mentioned are actu-
ally to be transferred, it indicates a major closening of Iraqi ties
with the Soviet Union. Both sources indicate that the number of
Soviet technicians and advisers will increase substantially in order
to help the Iraqi military absorb these new weapons. The introduc-
tion of the MIG-25 to a Persian Gulf country, whether in a combat
role or a reconnaisance role, must be viewed as a response to the
Iranian F-14s which are now being delivered, just as the MIG-23s
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were to the earlier order of the same airplane. As in the case of
its earlier deployment to Egypt, the MIG-25 will be tightly con-
109
trolled and flown by Soviet pilots. At the very least, this
agreement can be viewed as evidence of the continuation of the
Iraqi/Irano arms race.
The most significant portions of the agreement, as reported
by the Iranian press (if true) , do not relate to military hardware.
Reportedly, the Soviet Union has gained territorial control of the
largest Iraqi air force base at Shaibe, creating an enclave which is
sealed off from even the Iraqis. In return for the territoriality
the Iraqis are supposedly to receive covert Soviet support for any
proposed actions Iraq may choose to carry out against Persian Gulf
110
states. Since this portion of the agreement is reported only in
the Iranian press it is, of course, suspect. It is also question-
able whether the Iraqi government, which is very nationalistic,
would go quite as far as to allow Soviet territoriality.
Although little information is available on the subject, it
can be reasonably assumed that the general lack of widespread tech-
nological sophistication in Iraqi society provides the military with
a set of problems similar to those experienced by the Iranian mili-
tary. They possess sophisticated weapons of vast capability, but
without direct Soviet support, their ability to fully utilize those
capabilities is, at best, doubtful. As in the case of Iran, the
lack of technological familiarity and the absence of an industrial




The development of a Saudi Arabian military capability has
been influenced by two major factors: (1) that country's close ties
with the United States and Great Britain; and (2) the reign of King
Faisal ibn Abdul Aziz. Up to 1953 Saudi Arabia was strongly ruled
by Abdul Aziz ibn Abdul Rahman, known as Ibn Saud. Because of
the British hegemony in the Persian Gulf and the close economic ties
with the United States due to the Arabian-American Oil Company
(ARAMCO) , Ibn Saud's military ties were with these two states. From
1947 to 1950 Britain began a modernization of the Saudi armed forces
and provided officer training at Sandhurst, the British Military
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Academy. In June 1951 when Ibn Saud signed a mutual assistance
pact with the U.S., providing that country with basing rights for
its Strategic Air Command (SAC) bombers, the major responsibility
113
for training the Saudi forces passed to it. The equipment (small
,
114
amounts of World War II vintage armoured cars and airplanes) and
training that was provided to the Saudis by both the U.S. and Great
Britain as a result of these arrangements was in keeping with the
prevailing large power practice of defining a smaller state's
defense requirements in terms of East-West tensions and creating
small indigenous forces which would be dependent upon the outside
powers for real military security. The regular Saudi army and air
115
force created by the U.S. fit this model.
During the reign of Ibn Saud's successor, Saud ibn Abdul Aziz
al-Saud, the military development stagnated. The situation was com-
plicated by the suspension of diplomatic relations with Great
Britain in 1956 over the Suez Crisis and the establishment of closer
ties with Nasser's Egypt. In a show of support for the Arab cause
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Saudi Arabia joined in a tri-partite pact with Egypt and Syria and
116invited an Egyptian mission to help train its military forces.
During this period of competition with Egypt in Saudi Arabia, the
U.S. began supplying the Saudis with small numbers of more advanced
weaponry: 10 F-86F jet fighters in 1957, 15 M-24 Chaffee light
tanks in 1958-59, 10 M-47 Patton main battle tanks in 1960-61, and
117
11 more F-86F jets in 1962.
By 196 3 Saudi Arabia had begin to re-evaluate its security
requirements in light of Egyptian participation in the Yemeni Civil
War. By providing 12,000 troops to fight in the rebellion in
118
1962, Nasser compelled the Saudi government to realize that it
had no viable defense force which could control a Yemeni-type insur-
rection. The wholehearted military support of the U.S. in such an
event was open to question because of the U.S. recognition of the
Yemeni rebels and the subsequent termination of the SAC basing
119
agreement in 1962. It was as a result of this period of uncer-
tainty that Saudi Arabia began to formulate military requirements
based on its own perception of need rather than using imposed per-
ceptions. The re-establishment of relations with Great Britain in
1963 and the assumption of the throne by King Faisal the following
year set the stage for a serious attempt to develop a modern, albeit
small, Saudi military capability.
The first weapons acquisition which took place under both
the altered Saudi security perception and the leadership of King
Faisal was an air defense system for protection of the Saudi supply
lines to the Yemeni Royalists. Originally requested in 1963, the
system was to consist of advanced fighter aircraft and a surface to
air missile system. The Saudis clearly indicated their new attitude
by taking two years to evaluate four possible aircraft; the
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American F-5 and F-104, the British Lightning and the French Mirage
120
III. The December, 1965, decision produced a joint British/
American package deal. From the British, Saudi Arabia purchased 40
Lightning Mach 2+ interceptors, 25 Jet Provost light strike aircraft
and an advanced radar system. From the U.S. it obtained a HAWK
missile system (Table 3) .
The acquisition of these weapons was only the first step in
a decade- long modernization of the Saudi military. In 1966 the
Saudi government requested accelerated delivery of the American HAWKs
to deter attacks by Egyptian forces of the Saudi supply lines to the
Royalist Yemenis. When the U.S. refused, an emergency program,
Operation Magic Carpet, was begun by the British. The equipment
transferred, six Hunters, five Lightnings and 37 thunderbird SAM
(Table 3), were refurbished British arms. The significance of
Operation Magic Carpet lies in the fact that because Saudi Arabia
as yet had no trained pilots for the procured aircraft, British mer-
cenary pilots flew combat patrols for the Saudis when the aircraft
121
were deployed along the Yemeni border. The reason this is con-
sidered significant is because in recent history Saudi Arabia is the
only nation of the three major Gulf states which has been forced to
resort to hiring foreign mercenaries for combat operations. The
Soviets provided Iraq with pilots for its advanced aircraft, but
this was in order to retain tight control over the weapons. Evi-
dence that they have flown the aircraft in combat operations for the
Iraqis is lacking. The Americans have provided technical assistance
for their weapon systems but have stopped short of operating them
for the Persian Gulf clients. Also in 1966 the Saudis began a sig-
nificant modernization program for the ordnance corps of their army,
purchasing some 4200 tactical and general purpose vehicles and,
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most significantly, a modern logistics system (Table 3) . This
presented a very early indication of King Faisal's awareness of the
logistical problems associated with maintaining a modern armed force
and his intention of dealing seriously with the problem.
The close economic ties existing between the U.S. and Saudi
Arabia plus that government's staunch opposition to communism have
122
contributed to a strongly pro-Western Saudi foreign policy.
Despite this policy, however, relations between the two countries
have been periodically strained because of the firm Saudi support
of the Arab cause and the U.S. support for Israel. In one such
period following the June War, Saudi Arabia expanded its arms
suppliers to include France and Italy. From France it purchased
some 200 AML-90 Panhard armoured cars in spring 1968, followed by
six Alouette III weapons carrying helicopters the following year
(Table 3) . Following the helicopter purchase it was announced
that Saudis would begin to receive training in the French arms
123
industry, another indication of their desire to place some dis-
tance between their government and that of the U.S. With Italy the
Saudis contracted for 24 AB205 and 206 helicopter (Table 3) . Des-
pite the strained relations during this period, the U.S. supplied
some older M-41 Walker Bulldog tanks and several medium lift trans-
port aircraft (C-118s, C-123s, and C-140s) as shown in Table 3.
In relation to the military forces of the other major states
of the Persian Gulf, the armed forces of Saudi Arabia have always
been fairly small. Unlike Iran, Saudi Arabia made no public policy
of expanding its military as a hedge against an eventual British
withdrawal from the Gulf. However, the expansion of their air force
roughly coincided with the shift of Iranian defense orientation to




early 1966 the Saudi air force numbered a mere 600 men. One year





which was confirmed by Sellars in 1968. Although it is possible
that an awareness of an eventual British departure played a part in
the expansion of the air force, the size of the expansion and the
fact that a like expansion did not take place in the other Saudi
armed forces tends to discount this possibility. Although the army
received light tanks and armoured cars during the following two
years, the size of the force did not change. It remained steady at
30,000 men, organized in five infantry brigades with light armoured
127
support, well past the beginning of the current decade. After
the British announcement, the Saudis modestly expanded their minus-
cule naval force by the acquisition of a few coastal patrol boats
and hovercraft from Great Britain (Table 1) . By not acquiring
offensive naval vessels the Saudis were tacitly acceding, at least
temporarily, to a Persian-imposed stability in the Gulf as a
replacement for that which had been supplied by the departing
British. The 1969 contract for three Jaguar fast attack torpedo
boats with West Germany again expanded the naval capability only
slightly (Table 3) during a period when the littoral states were all
seeking workable post-British Persian Gulf policies. The only major
weapon acquisition which occurred between the time of the British
announcement and the withdrawal was the October 1971 contract for
50 F-5A/B interceptor and fighter/bomber aircraft (Table 3) . These
airplanes, in conjunction with the Lightnings, would provide a more
varied air defense capability. Because of the timing of the con-




The Iranian seizure of Abu Musa and the two Tumbs in Novem-
ber 1971, provided a new background for the development of the
128
Saudi military capability. Although its public reaction was mild,
Saudi Arabia contracted for a major expansion of its naval forces
only three months after the seizure. The Saudi Naval Expansion Pro-
gram contract agreed to provide thirteen small surface to surface
missile equipped ships, a minesweeping force, assorted smaller craft,
new shore installations and extensive training (Table 3) . A contract
of this magnitude cannot be regarded merely as a spur of the moment
response to the Iranian seizure, however. Since a precedent had been
set in 1965 by the two year evaluation of the U.S. /Great Britain air
defense proposals, it is very likely a similar extensive evaluation
took place in this case. Despite this, to disregard the Iranian
action and its probable effect on the Saudi motivation for naval
expansion would be foolish. Taken together, it appears that while
the Saudis were not loudly condemning the Iranians they were making
significant preparations for an eventual assumption of a greater role
in the Gulf affairs.
In operating and maintaining a modern military capability
Saudi Arabia faces the same problems created by the lack of a tech-
nological/industrial base as do the other Gulf states. Like Iran,
the country is attempting to overcome this serious deficiency, but
whereas Iran is utilizing military equipment joint production con-
tracts to spur the technological advance, Saudi Arabia is placing
129
more importance on the civilian sector. The Saudis do have at
least one contract similar to the Iranian model; a $1.14 billion
contract with Raytheon for improved HAWK SAM with half the work
130
being done in Saudi Arabia. An additional problem the Saudis
face that Iran and Iraq do not, is the small size of the Saudi
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population and an accompanying critical shortage of skilled manpower,
which places severe limitations on its capacity for significantly
131
expanding its military capability. Since these problems and
limitations dictate a Saudi dependence on foreign technical assis-
tance which, in all probability will last longer than a similar
Iranian dependence, they must be considered during discussion of
the dramatic weapons purchases which occurred after 1972.
From 197 3 to the present, Saudi Arabia, like Iran, has been
using its increased oil revenues to greatly expand its military capa-
bility (Table 3). The reasons behind this expansion include: the
availability of funds to purchase the desired arms, the Saudi desire
to develop its own military to help prevent big power involvement in
132
the Persian Gulf, the increasing Saudi role as an arms supplier
133
to the front-line Arab states, the possibility of war with Iraq
and the above mentioned response to the expansion of the Iranian
. .
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military. Although the level of sophistication of the newer
Saudi weapons is generally similar to that possessed by Iraq and
Iran (see Tables 1, 2, and 3), it must be pointed out that the over-
all Saudi capability nowhere near approaches that of Iran. Even
though the Saudis started purchasing modern weapons in 1966, it has
only been in the last few years that they, with the help of foreign
advisors, have formulated specific force and mission requirements
beyond those existing in the 1950s and early 1960s. In addition to
the naval expansion program, in 1973 the U.S. developed a moderniza-
tion program for the National Guard which would give it a reasonable
ability to respond to terrorist and guerrilla activities. One of
the lesser known reasons associated with the granting of this con-
tract was the Saudi concern about two large fires which took place
at the ARAMCO refinery at Ras Tanura in 1973. They were caused
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In late 1974 the Pentagon, at the request of the Saudi
Arabians, completed a survey of the Saudi military needs up to 1984.
The U.S. recommendations to the Saudi government included the crea-
tion of (1) four mechanized brigades, each with three mechanized
battalions; (2) a tank battalion and other combat and support ele-
ments; (3) an airborne brigade with three airborne infantry batta-
lions; (5) one attack helicopter battalion; and (6) two air cavalry
136
battalions with two assault support helicopter companies. These
recommendations, when enacted, will provide Saudi Arabia with the
ability to significantly project its military power beyond its own
borders and will constitute another quentum leap in military capa-
bility. The fact that the Saudis requested such a broad survey to
be made by a foreign power is indicative of the state of their
planning ability. Although they possess the means to purchase a
modern armed force, they lack the ability to design their own. The
real question is whether or not the Saudis have enough personnel to
man the new units. In the past the Saudis hired mercenary pilots to
fly combat missions against the Yemenis. Given the very real man-
power problem described above they may have to resort to the use of




MILITARY CAPABILITIES AND POWER POLITICS
Throughout history military capabilities have played a major
role in power politics. The degree to which a state achieves its
political objectives can, in many instances, be attributed to its
desire and ability to militarily support its political decisions.
This thesis has been lent support by the actions of the major Persian
Gulf States in recent years. Before delving deeply into this aspect
of Gulf politics, a few words regarding the overall political objec-
tives of the three Gulf states would be in order.
Since turning its attention to the Gulf in 1965, the Iranian
government has had two main objectives in its Gulf policy: first,
that the oil installations and the passage of oil out of the Gulf be
protected from disruption and second, that the governments of the
137
region be protected against subversion, be it internal or external.
Saudi Arabian Gulf objectives , although less energetic than those of
its Persian neighbor, are also fairly well defined. They revolve
around a strong defense of Islam, Koranic traditions and teachings,
and secondly, a staunch opposition to regional communism and related
138
non-traditional ideologies. Despite the differences which have
existed between Saudi Arabia and Iran they find common ground in
their opposition to the anti-monarchial ideology expressed by the
third large Gulf state, Iraq. As the only non-traditional govern-




revolutionary view of regional politics. Diametrically opposed to
Iranian hegemony in the Gulf, it also favors extensive internal
139
political reform in its neighboring countries. In pursuit of
these objectives over the last seventeen years each of the three
major Gulf states has utilized its military capability to one degree
or another. It is interesting to note that the success or failure
of the political objectives in this period has not rested entirely
upon the overt use of a superior military capability by one state,
but more often has hinged upon the strength of the resolve in a
government to use what military capability is available.
The clearest example of a military capability playing a
pivotal role in Persian Gulf politics is seen in the series of
crises which occurred between Iran and Iraq over the Shatt-al-Arab.
As discussed earlier, the dispute between the two states regarding
the use of the waterway had been of long standing, traceable in
modern times to the Frontier Treaty, signed in 1937. Although the
treaty placed the boundary demarcation along the thalweg line in
the immediate vicinity of Abadan and called for an eventual sharing
by Iran in the administrative duties, dredging and pilotage of the
140
waterway, in reality, the problems had not been resolved. Over
the years, Iran retained complete control of those services, in
effect making Iranian use of the waterway reliant upon Iraqi good
141
will. After the Iraqi government interferred with the passage
of Iranian ships in 1959, the Shah began to reassert his country's
demand for settlement of the dispute. In reaction to the Shah's
agitation, Iraq declared that portion of the 1937 treaty establish-
ing thalweg demarcation to be null and void, thereby claiming the
142
. ......
entire waterway. This action caused both sides to initiate mili-
tary preparations such as altering their armed forces and fortifying
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their borders, but no open military action resulted. The Shah had
doubts about his country's military capability and avoided the pend-
143
mg military confrontation. As pointed out in the earlier dis-
cussion of Iraq's military development, the first Soviet arms
transfer to Iraq had tipped the balance of Gulf military power in
Iraq's favor. It was enough of a military edge that it prevented
the Shah from opting for military action in this case. Iraq, on the
other hand, had the military capability to press its claim, but it
chose not to do so. One possible reason for the Iraqi reluctance was
the domestic political instability of the time. General Abd al-Karim
Qassem, the military ruler, had survived an assasination attempt in
October 1959 and the trials of those accused were going on during
144
the Shatt-al-Arab crisis. Because of this mutual reluctance to
use force, the status of the waterway remained unchanged after the
situation calmed down. Iran retained control of the waters near
145
Abadan and Iraq still administered the river services.
The 1959 balance of power between Iran and Iraq existed for
much of the next decade, precluding any significant change in the
respective positions on the Shatt-al-Arab question. Although inflam-
matory rhetoric periodically flowed from both sides, it was not until
Iran had gained a clear military advantage that a break in the stale-
mate occurred. On April 15, 1969, Iraq reasserted its claim to the
entire Shatt-al-Arab, demanding that ships flying the Iranian flag
lower it before entering the estuary and that no Iranian naval per-
sonnel be aboard. In the earlier confrontation Iraq's threat of
force had been implied by the massing of troops. However, in this
instance the Iraqi deputy foreign minister publicly warned that
146
military action would be taken if the demands were not met. In
1959-60 Iraq could have carried out such a threat with a fair chance
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of success; however, in 1969 when the threat was made, Iraq was in
a poor position to try to back it up. Although Iraq had more combat
aircraft, 213 to 180, Iran was receiving its F-4D Phantom jets which
were technologically superior to the MIG-21 mainstay of Iraq's air
147
force. Also, for any ground action which might result from the
controversy, Iraq would have been at a distinct numerical disadvan-
tage. At the time Iraq's army numbered 70,000 men, some of whom
were committed well away from the Shatt-al-Arab in deployments to
Syria, Jordan, and against the Kurds in northern Iraq. Against
those troops which were available for duty in southern Iraq, Iran
could muster large portions of its 200,000 man army, which at that
148
time was not engaged in any major combat deployment. Likewise,
Iran possessed a naval capability which Iraq could not match
(Tables 1 and 2)
.
With these factors in mind the Iranian government quickly
called Iraq's military bluff. Voiding the 1937 Frontier Treaty on
April 19, it ordered the Iranian military to escort Iranian
149
freighters down the Shatt-al-Arab on April 22 and 25, 1969. In
the face of Iranian military resolve, Iraq backed down, making no
serious attempt to carry out its threat. Iranian de facto use of
150
. .
the waterway was thus established, and the Iranians continued to
use the river under that principle until the 1975 settlement,
The political results of the two incidents are interesting.
In the earlier crisis, although Iraq had the military advantage, by
opting for a non-military solution, it failed to achieve the politi-
cal goal of obtaining complete control over the Shatt-al-Arab. Had
it pressed the matter militarily it is likely that goal would have
been achieved. In the 1969 crisis, when the advantage lay with
Iran, its political goal of unrestricted passage on the waterway
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was achieved. This success is largely attributable to the decisive
manner in which Iran used its military power.
The use of military persuasion has not been the only diplo-
matic maneuver employed by the Iranians. Although the lesson on
the value of forceful action in achieving political aims had been
learned by the Iranians, it was only one viable option for the
settlement of their disputes. The 1970 Iranian decision to abandon
its claim to Bahrain is a case in point.
After Great Britain declared its intention of withdrawing
from the Gulf and its intention of creating an Arab federation of
the lower Gulf, Iran reasserted its historical claim to the island
151
of Bahrain and "a number of other Gulf islands as well." It has
been suggested that Iran advanced this claim merely as a temporary
strategem to show Gulf interest while it attempted to devise a
152
broader Gulf policy. While this theory may have some validity,
it disregards the fact that Iran had been pursuing a Gulf-oriented
security policy since 1965. To say that Iran was diplomatically
unprepared for Britain's announcement after it had been militarily
preparing for such a decision for three years is a little difficult
to believe. It is more likely that the claim was advanced after
serious consideration, with the full intention of obtaining sover-
eignty over Bahrain. Had Iran decided to press its claim militarily
it stood a good chance of succeeding, but, in so doing, the country
would have placed itself in an untenable diplomatic situation. Iran's
occupation of Bahrain by military force would have been of little
value in the face of united Arab diplomatic opposition, which was
virtually assured in this case, since the Iranian claim had provided
a rallying point for both revolutionary and conservative Arab
states. After state visits to Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, the Shah

38
realized that by relinquishing his claim to Bahrain, and thus remov-
ing a major point of friction, friendlier relations with Saudi
Arabia could be established. These could ultimately lead to Saudi
help for another Iranian political objective, that of excluding
154
outside powers from the Gulf. The Iranian decision to abandon
its claim to Bahrain, then, was not due to a lack of military capa-
bility, rather, it was politically motivated for the purpose of
achieving other goals.
That Iran could have succeeded militarily was demonstrated
a few months after the Shah relinquished Iran's claim to Bahrain.
In a co-ordinated military exercise held near the Persian island of
Beni Farur in November 1970, Iran displayed its newly-acquired
mobile strike capability. The Iranian news coverage of the exercise
reported that Iran's military planning had begun to bear fruit and
that the country would be in a position to exercise undisputed
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leadership in the Gulf after the British withdrawal. This type
of Persian saber rattling, coming when it did, was designed to
impress the Arabs with Iranian military flexibility and to prove
that the abandonment of the Bahrain claim was not due to a lack of
Iranian military resolve. It was also to serve as a dress rehearsal
for the seizure of three Gulf islands which occurred almost exactly
one year later.
Another of the reasons Iran gave up its claim to Bahrain was
in the hope of obtaining British and Arab support for its claim on
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the "other Gulf islands." These other Gulf islands, identified
in early 1970 as Abu Musa, Greater and Lesser Tumbs , were strategi-
cally located near the strait of Hormuz. As in the case of Bahrain,
the islands at one time had been Iran's possessions, but had been




1900. The major reason advanced for the Iranian claim was the
overriding Iranian foreign policy concern of the period, the unin-
terrupted passage of oil. The Shah reasoned that if the islands fell
into "irresponsible hands" the sea lanes through the Straits could
158
be interdicted very easily.
The Shah first attempted to regain sovereignty over these
islands by two non-military strategems; negotiations with the depart-
ing British, and a series of public actions designed to demonstrate
to his Arab neighbors the seriousness of the Iranian claim. These
actions included: (1) a February 1971 declaration by the Shah that
Iran would resort to force, if necessary, in order to regain the
islands; (2) an Iranian press campaign to mobilize public opinion in
favor of the move; (3) British refusal, at Iranian insistance, to
permit Occidental Petroleum to begin drilling operations near Abu
Musa, and (4) Iranian offers of economic assistance to the Shiekhdoms
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in return for an agreement on the islands. As the negotiations
dragged on the Iranians increasingly adopted a harder line and began
to opt for military persuasion. In May, Iran's armed forces were
ordered to fire upon British aircraft in the Gulf which had been
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accused of harrassing Iranian forces. Although this incident was
smoothed over by the British, it had signaled Iran's determination
to once again use its military power to gain Gulf political goals.
As the date for the inauguration of the British sponsored
Arab federation drew closer, negotiations intensified. The Shah
realized that if the new state were to receive international recog-
nition with the Iranian claim still unsettled, any type of Iranian
action to regain the islands would be much more difficult. For this
reason, the deadline for the resolution of the problem was December 1,




formed. An eleventh hour agreement was reached between the Shah
and the ruling Shiekh of Sharjah which allowed joint occupation of
1 A
Abu Musa in return for sharing of the oil resources located there.
No agreement could be arranged with the ruler of Ras al-Khaimah,
however. The day preceeding the formation of the UAE, Iran settled
the issue by force of arms, occupying all three islands. In the
landings on the Tumbs , a total of seven people were killed.
The Iranian operation against the three islands must be
viewed from two perspectives; the military and the diplomatic. Mili-
tarily, by occupying the islands Iran had denied their use to an
enemy as a future base of operations against the shipping lanes and
demonstrated the regional supremacy of the Iranian armed forces. The
only military force indigenous to the Gulf which was capable of seri-
ously resisting the Iranian invasion was Iraq's. Iraq had the neces-
sary long range bombers (TU-16s) to reach the islands, but they
could not have been supported by the short range Iraqi MIG-21s and
would have been easy prey for the long range fighters and SAM-
equipped ships of the Iranians. Nor did Iraq have a serious naval
presence in the Gulf. With these critical capabilities lacking, the
outcome was never in doubt.
From the diplomatic perspective the results are much more
interesting. In the Shah's view, the operation accomplished a num-
ber of regional political objectives. It established the effective-
ness of the Iranian military as a regional deterrent. Likewise, it
was a clear indication to his neighbors of his seriousness concerning
Iranian military hegemony. Finally, it showed that he was intent on
establishing this hegemony through every means available, military
164
and diplomatic, despite any Arab protest. On the other side of
the Gulf the results were not perceived in the same way. Although
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the reaction in Saudi Arabia was mild, in the shiekhdoms, and more
importantly in Iraq, it was much more severe. The occupation
alarmed the inhabitants of the shiekhdoms and created doubts con-





riots which caused some property damage, but very little else.
The virulent Iraqi reaction, including the severence of diplomatic
relations with Iran and the sponsoring of a protest against it in
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the United Nations, indicates that had Iraq possessed the mili-
tary capability necessary to effectively oppose the Iranian action,
it probably would have done so. This also means that in 1971, how-
ever unwillingly, Iraq recognized the existence of Iranian military
hegemony. It is highly doubtful that Iraq still does. Given the
Iraqi arms acquisitions that have taken place in the last five years,
especially the long range MIG-2 3 fighters and the possible recent
contract for MIG-25s and missile equipped frigates, were the same
operation to take place today, the results might be very different.
The above discussion has centered on the role the Iranian
military capability has played in Persian Gulf politics. Like its
Persian neighbor, Iraq has periodically used its military capability
to pursue political ends. When Kuwait received its independence
from Great Britain in June 1961, Iraq laid claim to the whole of
Kuwait; however, in the face of British and Arab League diplomatic
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and military opposition it failed to press its claim. In this
instance Iraq lacked the will to militarily support its political
decision over the objections of its sister Arab states. Iraq
extended diplomatic recognition to Kuwait in 1963, however, the
international boundary between the two countries has never been





This practice of acceding to regional opposition was to be
repeated when the border dispute flared up again. In late 1972,
after Kuwait refused to grant Iraq a loan, the latter massed troops
in the border area. Over the next few months negotiations were
carried out between the two states seeking agreement on an Iraqi
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request to construct an oil pipeline across Kuwaiti territory,
but these talks were to become stalled over Kuwaiti fears that the
Soviet Union might build the pipeline. After this breakdown Iraq
advanced a claim for two large islands in the vicinity of Umm Qasr,
a commercial and naval base being developed near the Kuwaiti border.
In March 1973, for the expressed purpose of expanding the
defense perimeter around Umm Qasr, Iraq attacked a Kuwaiti border
post in the area. Although Iraq received highly visible moral sup-
port from the Soviet Union by the visit of the Commander in Chief
of the Soviet Navy and a contingent of Soviet naval ships during the
. . .
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crisis, it did not achieve its stated political goal. Iraq
pulled its troops out of the area on April 7 in the face of strong
regional objections and offers of assistance to Kuwait from both
Saudi Arabia and Iran. As in the 1961 border crisis and the Shatt-
al-Arab crisis of the same year, Iraq was unwilling to "go to the
wall" militarily to support its political decision. It should not
be assumed that because of this lack of resolve Iraq lacked the
military capability to achieve its goal or that its reluctance to
fully utilize its capability will be repeated in future disputes.
In 1973 Iraq possessed 224 combat aircraft, a 90,000 man,
well-equipped army and a light offensive naval capability (three
OSA class FPBs armed with STYX SSM) , which could be effective in
areas with restricted maneuvering room, such as the approaches to
171
. ^ ,Umm Qasr. In addition, it had the public support of the Soviet
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Union which could and probably would provide whatever additional
military assistance was required. With these facts in mind it should
be apparent that it was not the prospect of military action which
forced Iraq to back down, but the diplomatic pressure resulting from
the Arab League's opposition. Since the leaders of the Iraqi regime
172
were pan-Arab m sentiment the prospect of isolation within the
Arab world was not appealing to them. Although the border conflict
died down after the withdrawal, the dispute has yet to be resolved
and is currently flaring up again.
Ostensibly as a result of the Kuwaiti government's dissolu-
tion of the Kuwaiti National Assembly, Iraq's armed forces crossed
the Kuwaiti border on September 9, 1976, penetrating as deep as
17 3 ....five miles. The Kuwaiti response to this territorial incursion
has been more restrained than in the 197 3 dispute. The government
has viewed the incursion as an action designed to compliment the
political warfare the Iraqis have been waging over the dismissal of
the National Assembly, which silenced public leftist dissent in
Kuwait. Since a good portion of Iraq's armed forces are tied up
along the Syrian border and Iraq's war with the Kurds seems to be
renewing itself, it appears that Iraq's military infringement of
174
Kuwaiti territory is more bluff and bluster than a serious attack.
Kuwait has appealed to individual Arab governments (Egypt and Syria)
and formally threatened Iraq with a complaint to the Arab League,
but appears not to feel as seriously threatened as it was in the
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1973 dispute. Iraq's actions are very similar to those which it
took in the 1969 Shatt-al-Arab crisis, when it was in a poor position
to militarily support its decisions.
Although the current border dispute may not seem too serious
from the Kuwaiti point of view, serious doubts exist as to the
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ultimate stability of the border, especially in view of the recent
Iraqi arms contract that has apparently been signed with the Soviet
Union. The increased Soviet support and military presence in Iraq
that this contract implies may provide the impetus for a serious
border clash with Kuwait in the future. To cast further doubt on
its ultimate intentions, Iraq is presently cultivating the support
of the various national liberation movements of the Middle East, such
as the Palestine Revolution Political Committee, the People's Front
for the Liberation of Baluchistan, the Front for the Liberation of
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Eritrea, and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Oman. If
Iraq ultimately places more political value on its associations with
these groups and the Soviet Union than it does on its relations with
the Arab League states, it is quite possible that, when the next
border flare-up occurs, Iraq will fully utilize its military capa-
bility despite objections or intervention by the Arab League or Iran.
In the pursuit of its Gulf political objectives, Saudi
Arabia has not relied on its military capability as heavily as has
Iran or Iraq. As mentioned above, one of the overriding concerns of
Saudi Gulf policy has been the preservation of traditional monarchial
rule by a staunch opposition to opposing ideologies. In the settle-
ment of disputes with traditional states, Saudi Arabia has generally
ignored the existence of its military capability. On the other hand,
when non-traditional ideologies have been involved, the Saudis have
relied upon their military capability in one way or another.
In the long standing dispute with Abu Dhabi over the Buraimi
Oasis, the only military action occurred in 1955 when a Saudi police
detachment was forcibly evicted from one of the villages by the
177
Trucial Oman Scouts. By the time the British left the Gulf lr
1971, the Saudis possessed a large enough military capability to
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settle the issue by force of arms if it had chosen to do so (Table 3)
,
but by this time the communal interest of both states in preserving
the traditional mode of rule had become apparent. The 1974 peaceful
settlement in which Saudi Arabia recognized Abu Dhabian sovereignty
over six of the disputed villages in return for a division of dis-
178
puted oil field demonstrates this point.
The military reaction of the Saudi government to opposing
ideologies was demonstrated fairly early by its participation in the
Yemeni civil war. It was followed up in December 1971, when, at
the request of Sultan Qabus of Oman, King Faisal pledged financial
and military assistance to him for use against the rebels in
179
Dhofar. Likewise, the Saudis have actively opposed the activi-
ties of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Oman in all parts of
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the Gulf. During the 197 3 Iraqi-Kuwaiti border crisis Saudi
Arabia moved some of its military forces into position along the
Saudi-Iraqi border and offered military assistance to the Kuwaiti
181
government. The use of military capabilities in these instances
shows that the Saudis, like their more militarily active Gulf neigh-
bors, will use their military capability to seek political goals.
Although the military capability available for opposing these forces
has been fairly small in the past, the expanded Saudi military
described earlier in this paper can provide a much more potent and
effective tool for opposing the non-traditional ideologies.

CHAPTER III
MILITARY CAPABILITIES AND DOMESTIC
POLITICAL STABILITY
The discussion of military capabilities and power politics
presented thus far has focused solely on international political
objectives. It has been pointed out that a country's success or
failure in reaching these objectives has not rested entirely on the
overt use of superior military strength, but has often hinged upon
the strength of resolve the government has displayed. One of the
major factors which contributes to a government's strength of resolve
in foreign affairs is its domestic political stability. Conversely,
actual or threatened domestic political instability can rapidly
erode a government's strength of resolve and render it incapable of
positive action in international power politics. What must be
explored at this point is the key element of Persian Gulf politics:
The question of political stability and its relationship to the ever-
increasing military capabilities described above.
The relationship has two equally important aspects: first,
that political instability may adversely affect the development or
maintenance of a viable military capability; and second, that mili-
tary capability may adversely affect political stability. The dis-
tinction between the two aspects is not as clear as might be expected.
In practice they tend to overlap and become interdependent. Because




for each of the Gulf states. Consider the following: The keys to
the effectiveness of a military organization are the non-quantifiable
dimensions of manpower, such as discipline, efficiency, motivation,
and morale. By creating suspicion, distrust, and dissension within
the ranks, political instability can adversely affect the manpower
element of a military capability. Likewise, dissatisfaction with
existing domestic political processes may prompt military commanders
to force political change through extra-legal means. As officers
are absorbed into politics or are removed for political reasons sub-
sequent to this change, the turnover of military commands can erode
the discipline and efficiency within the military. Excessive politi-
zation of the officer corps can turn the military from a force in
the service of the state into a tool used for hegemony within the
state. Once this occurs, not only is military capability weakened,
but the foundations of the stability of the state are undermined as
182
well. This scenario has been played out xn full in only one
Persian Gulf state, Iraq, but both Iran and Saudi Arabia have
experienced at least some of its elements.
In its relatively short 45 year history as an independent
state, Iraq has experienced a disproportionate amount of military
intervention in its domestic politics. In that span it has wit-
nessed two separate periods of domestic political instability in
which the military has played a decisive role. The first of these
began in October 1936 when the acting Chief of Staff of the Iraqi
army forced the ruling monarch to form a new government. It ended
in May 1941 with the total defeat of the Iraqi armed forces by the
invading allies. In that span of five years, military intervention
in domestic politics resulted in a total of seven coups d'etat.
This period, with its dramatic denouement, presents strong evidence
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Iraq's political stability was initially upset by one man,
Brigadier Bakr Sidqi, who used the existing military capability to
inject his personal political ideas into the domestic political
arena. This established a precedent not only for his fellow offi-
cers of the Iraqi army but also for dissatisfied officers throughout
184
the Arab world. Domestic politics degenerated into a battleground
in which various factions of the army and the civilian leadership
struggled for power. Although the military had a significant role
in each government that was formed during this period, it was not
until the seventh coup in April 1941 that total control of the civil-
185
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lan government was in the hands of the military. During the five
year struggle, the primary attention of the competing officers was
necessarily on the political situation with concomitant lack of
attention to the military units they still commanded. In a military
force the results of command neglect are predictable: initial con-
fusion, sagging morale, a drop in motivation, a lack of initiative,
and eventual alienation. All of this adds up to a severe loss of
combat effectiveness. Considering the inept resistance which was
offered by it to the British occupation forces, it is highly probable
that such a progression took place within the Iraqi army. One reason
which has been advanced for the swift, humiliating defeat of that
186
army in 1941 is the excessive politization of its officer corps.
In their preoccupation with domestic politics, these officers
neglected their troops. Thus, they forfeited their opportunity to
instill in their men those mandatory ingredients of effective mili-
tary strength: motivation and morale. In this instance political




The second period of Iraqi domestic political instability in
which the military played the dominant role began with the overthrow
of the Hashimite dynasty in July 1958 and has continued to the pres-
ent day. This period like its predecessor, has been marked by a
succession of coups, counter-coups, and attempted coups. In each of
these, the existence of a military capability has been a common,
decisive ingredient of instability, though it cannot be said to have
been the sole instigating factor. The record of the 1958 revolution
provides the best evidence to support this contention.
The forces which culminated in the brief but violent revolu-
tion in July 1958 had been brewing for several years, but had been
kept in check by the monarchial government. The government under
Nuri al-Said was stern and authoritarian, relying heavily on the
187
army, the secret police, and a controlled press. Between the
reestablishment of civilian authority in 1941 and the July Revolu-
tion, the army publicly seemed to be in agreement with the govern-
ment and loyal to the throne. During this period it provided help
when needed to suppress violent opposition to governmental policies,
e.g., the 1952 Baghdad riots over the issue of direct elections and
188
the 1956 riots following the Suez crisis. During the early 1950s
with the aid of increased oil revenues Nuri was able to institute
major economic reforms. Despite such measures, he became an object
of hatred and vilification for his authoritarian methods and close
associations with the British. He made an effort to maintain the
loyalty of the officer corps by providing favorable terms of service
and pension requirements, however, these were only partially success-
189
ful. Nuri may have felt fairly secure because of the army's pub-
lic support of the government, his efforts at appeasing the office
corps, and his success in economic reform, but he made a fatal error
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in underestimating the extent to which discontent permeated both the
military and civilian population.
In the intensely nationalistic atmosphere of Iraq in the
early 1950s, Nuri ' s cautious reform programs only succeeded in alien-
ating him from large segments of the Iraqi civilian population. The
officer corps likewise had become disaffected and divided. It was
split into two distinct, though informal groups: those older, gen-
erally more senior officers identified with the interests of the
monarchy; and the younger, more junior officers from the middle and
lower classes who represented the forces of intense nationalism and
radical change. In 1952, under the influence of the successful
Egyptian Revolution, several groups of officers formed secret cells




politics. In the years which followed, these largely uncoordi-
nated secret groups expanded, attracting many young officers to the
philosophy of radical change. Though there was much discussion and
planning in these groups and their influence was deeply felt in the
191
military, no overt military action resulted. The 1956 exposure
and neutralization of one very influential group temporarily para-
lyzed the movement, but the nominal leadership was assumed by
Brigadier Abd al-Karim Qassem shortly thereafter. His group, known
as the Baghdad Organization, developed into the leading group pro-
192
posing military intervention.
The widespread dissatisfaction with domestic political pro-
cesses had lain the groundwork for the revolution. Throughout this
period of secret activity within the officer corps, close contacts
were maintained with sympathetic civilian politicians. Because of
the diversity of political opinion, i.e., moderate nationalism, pan-
arabism, pro-communism, and Ba'athist socialism, each group contacted
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separate politicians from whom they received guidance, encouragement,
193
and support. Although the revolution was the result of planning
by only seven military officers, it received the immediate support
of much of the civilian population. The military took control of
the government, but the new regime included many prominent civilian
... 194politicians. Although the military capability provided the
vehicle, it cannot be said that the military was solely responsible
for the revolution. Civilian participation in the pre-revolution
secret activities was an important factor.
After the revolution, the ruling military-civilian coalition
did not last long and a struggle for power quickly developed among
the military officers. Within three months the first attempt to
remove Qassem occurred. Colonel Abd al-Salam Muhammed Arif , who had
been Qassem' s major supporter immediately prior to and during the
revolution, led the attempt. Qassem suppressed the move and imme-
diately began to suppress the political groups which had originally
195
collaborated with him. As Qassem turned the Iraqi government
into a military dictatorship, he transformed the army into a per-
sonal political tool. The manner in which he carried this out, i.e.,
a purge of the officers who disagree with him, became a pattern that
was repeated often in the later Iraqi corps. In November 1963, Arif
used the same technique to eliminate the Ba'athist civilians who had
come to power with him nine months earlier. For a period of years
196
the army again was in complete control. After the Ba'athists
regained power by joining forces with the moderates in a July 1968
coup, they purged the non-Ba'athist elements in another coup only
197
.
two weeks later. After an aborted conservative coup in September
1968, the Ba'athist government led by President (Major General) Ahmed
Hassan Bakr began a long purge to "uproot, foreign influence and
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liquidate the pockets of counter-revolution" which included numerous
198
arrests, imprisonments, and executions.
The period after 1958 was marked by constant political tur-
moil. Army intervention in domestic politics became a fact of life
and the officer corps was purged to some degree by every government
that came to power. This process had a deliterious effect on the
army and resulted in a severe drop in morale among the troops. Fur-
ther, the rapid command changes along with a general climate of




ance of the military. As in the 1936-1941 period, military capa-
bility suffered greatly due to political instability. The generally
poor showing of the Iraqi army against the Kurds in the 1960s is
evidence of this. After consolidating their hold on Iraqi politics
in the late 1960s, the Ba'athist government made an attempt to
reverse this trend and to impose a measure of stability on the Iraqi
army by isolating it from politics. According to one observer this
isolation has stabilized the officer corps and has provided a base
for regaining in the 1970s the morale and efficiency which was lost
200
in the 1960s.
The isolation hypothesis requires closer scrutiny. The
isolation of the officer corps means that, military opposition had
been removed from influential political positions. Advancement in
the Iraqi officer corps was made dependent upon membership in the
Ba'ath party, but this did not mean isolation or even depolitization
of the army. It was merely an attempt to fit all of the officers
into one political mold, an attempt which has not been entirely
201
successful. In July 1973 there were reports of a non-Ba ' athist
coup attempt from within the army followed by a large scale purge of
202
the military. Even though the government may eliminate all the
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supporters of opposing ideologies, it does not mean political
stability will be achieved. Given the volatility of Iraqi politics
and the history of military intervention, in that country, it is not
unlikely that sometime in the future an Iraqi officer, even though
he may be a Ba'athist, may decide that only he can properly lead the
country- When this occurs, it will provide new evidence of the
interdependence of Iraqi military capability and Iraqi domestic
political instability.
In contrast to the chronic instability that has character-
ized Iraq's domestic politics over the last two decades, Iran has
been relatively stable. It has been stable in that it has not wit-
nessed a succession of Iraqi-style coups d'etat which have weakened
both the government and the military- Nonetheless, Iran has experi-
enced some of the individual elements of the Iraqi patterns of
political instability. Like Iraq, Iran has a history of military
intervention in civilian politics. Unlike Iraq, one man has been
able to maintain control of the military, using it to impose politi-
cal stability despite the presence of deep destabilizing elements.
Rather than political instability adversely affecting military capa-
bility, the relative calm which has prevailed on the domestic scene
has enabled the Shah to develop a viable military capability.
Twentieth century Iran's history of military intervention in
domestic politics predates that of modern Iraq. In 1921 Reza Khan,
in command of 2500 Persian Cossacks, led a successful coup d'etat
enabling a respected civilian, Seyyid Zia ed-Din Tabataba'i, to take
203
, .
control of the government. As a reward for his services Reza
Khan was given command of the entire army. His rise to national
power and his maintenance of that power as shah was based largely
on his control of Iran's military capability. By using that
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capability to subjugate rebellious tribes and to generate widespread
physical security, he was able to increase his personal power and
assume positions of greater authority in the government. After he
established the Pahlavi dynasty in 1925, Reza Shah was able to
impose a political stability on the country which lasted until his
204
power base, the army, collapsed in World War II. One American
scholar has indicated that Reza Shah's dominant goal was the crea-
tion of a modern army strong enough to maintain internal control and
which would constitute a significant deterrant to foreign armed
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aggression. Main goal or not, the mxlitary capability which he
created kept him in control of Iran's domestic politics for sixteen
years, a fact not lost on his son. By example Reza Shah defined for
his successor the most productive relationship between military
capability and Iranian domestic stability. The fact that the
father's vaunted military capability turned out to be a house of
cards did not lessen the impact of the precedent on the son.
After he very nearly lost the throne in the political crisis
of 195 3, Muhammed Reza Shah resurrected his father's method of rule.
In order to stabilize domestic politics by expanding his control
over the Iranian government (as Reza Shah had done) he needed the
military as a power base. Unlike his father, though, the Shah did
not enjoy the full loyalty of the army. There existed in the mili-
tary substantial support for both the National Front and the Tudeh
Party. With the memories of the Mossadegh period still fresh, as
well as the 1949 Syrian and 1952 Egyptian coups, it was vital that
these elements be purged. The purge was carried out immediately,
resulting in the removal of hundreds of officers and non-commissioned
206
officers and the execution of some two dozen officers. To ensure
the loyalty of future officers, the Shah took upon himself the

responsibility for granting all promotions above the rank of major,
granting them only a personal examination of the officer's service
record. He also required that all junior promotions be made subject
to his approval. After the 1954 purge he began forcing out of the
service incompetent or corrupt officers as well as any officer of
questionable loyalty, the number of which by 1963 had exceeded 1000
207
officers. He extended his personal supervision so far as to for-
bid any meeting between general officers without his express permis-
sion, and began to personally make all major command assignments,
including putting senior military men in charge of ostensibly civil-
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lan organizations such as the gendarmerie and the national police.
In addition to these direct supervisory measures, the Shah
began a process of co-optation designed to instil loyalty in his
officers. To satisfy their combat needs he began negotiating for
and receiving more significant quantities of American military aid,
as outlined earlier in this paper. To satisfy their non-combat needs
the Shah began giving them special prerogatives. He increased their
pay, built them new housing units, established a sumptuous officer's
209
club in Tehran, and allowed special importation privileges. For
the senior officers there was the vitally important additional bene-
fit of sharing in the expanding power of the Shah. As long as they
enjoyed his favor, the senior officers were assured of significant
participation in the new military dominated state the Shah was
creating.
During this lengthy co-optation process, the Shah was using
the military to enforce political stability. The imposition of
martial law from 1953 to 1957 and again after the 1963 riots was
only the most dramatic expression of this fact. Whenever the police




ruthlessly. As pointed out above, the leadership of the civilian
security organs was passed to military officers, including, after
its creation, the State Security and Intelligence Organization
(SAVAK) . The treasonable offenses uncovered by these organizations
have all, since 1954, been tried before military courts. An increas-
ing number of purely civilian administrative posts have been given
to high ranking military officers including positions in the cabi-
nets, governorships, municipal posts, and numerous lesser positions
throughout the civil bureaucracy. After the institution of the
Shah's reform measures in 1963, the military assumed the added
responsibility of the organization and administration of three of
the major reform programs— the Literacy Corps, the Health Corps, and
211
the Development and Rural Extension Corps. Through this process
of militarizing the government, the Shah created the domestic politi-
cal stability necessary for sustained economic growth and freedom
of action in foreign affairs.
The Shah's consolidation and extension of power was not
without serious opposition from within the armed forces. In sepa-
rate incidents two generals, both chiefs of security organizations,
were charged with planning coups. In 1958 the head of army intelli-
gence, General Gharani, was exposed as the ringleader of a plot to
overthrow the government. This plot, reportedly exposed only at the
last minute, implicated two notable civilian politicians as well;
212
Ali Amini and Hasan Arsanjani. Four years later, General Timur
Bakhtiar, the former head of SAVAK, was rumored to be engineering a
coup against the Shah himself and was forced to leave the country
213
for exile in Europe.
Bakhtiar 's demotion and exile is but one example of the
methods used by the Shah to maintain control of the armed forces.
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As has been pointed out in various studies, another method the Shah
uses is playing the heads of competing organizations against one
another creating tensions between them and reducing the likelihood
214
of one becoming too powerful. If a military officer is in a
position to gain what the Shah considers too much power or influence
he is subject to rapid retirement, demotion, or transfer. For exam-
ple, in militarized Iran, with a rapidly developing military capa-
bility, the position of Chief of Staff of the armed forces is an
extremely important and influential post. When the occupant accrues
more power than the Shah intended him to have he is immediately
replaced by another four-star general. The Shah's pattern has been
well established. In 1966 General Hijazi, who had been in the
position for a number of years was retired without warning. In 1969
his replacement, General Ariyana was likewise retired. Two years
later General Firaydun Jam was suddenly removed and appointed Ambas-
sador to Spain, an action which was tantamount to political exile.
It is conceivable that these demotions and retirements were motivated
by other factors, but given the Shah's practice of manipulating the
215
politically influential members of Iranian society, such a con-
clusion is unlikely.
As a power base in his quest for political stability, eco-
nomic prosperity and Iranian hegemony in Persian Gulf affairs,
Muhammed Reza Shah has relied primarily on his ability to control
and maintain the loyalty of the Iranian armed forces. To date he
has been extraordinarily successful. By his co-optation efforts,
he has apparently created an officer corps that is not only loyal
to the throne, but to him personally. Although he has gone to great
lengths to keep them satisfied, there is always the danger that some
ambitious, reform-minded officer who is carefully watching for signs
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of domestic discontent may decide that his moment has come. Because
of the existence of the state intelligence networks, such a politi-
cally ambitious officer would have to be especially astute in order
216
to succeed. For this reason the danger to the Shah from this
quarter is fairly remote. For this reason the danger to the Shah
from this quarter is fairly remote, For the forseeable future the
Pahlavi definition of the relationship between political stability
and military capability will prevail. Unless the Shah simultaneously
alienates members of the intelligence establishment and the military,
thereby creating a situation in which members of both groups could
find mutuality of purpose, the system he has created will, in all
probability, detect and eliminate any serious opposition developing
from within.
Like its Persian neighbor across the Gulf, Saudi Arabia has
maintained its domestic political stability for a number of years,
though since the early 1960s it has witnessed significant signs of
political discontent. Despite the modernizing efforts of the gov-
ernment, several military-civilian plots against the government have
been uncovered. There is no Saudi history of Iraqi-style interven-
tion in domestic politics, but in the last decade substantial numbers
of young military officers have been implicated in anti-monarchial
activities. One man has maintained overall control of the military,
enabling a broad military capability to be developed, but since the
forces are not united in purpose, there exists the potential for the
military capability to be used to upset the political stability of
the state
.
As indicated in Table 4, the armed forces of Saudi Arabia,
like those of Iran and Iraq, are divided into regular and para-
military forces. In Saudi Arabia, though, the para-military National
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Guard has a special significance. It is the modern outgrowth of the
tribal force known as bhe White Army which Ibn Saud used to consoli-
217
date his power m the early part of the century. Because the
majority of the members of the National Guard are drawn from the
tribes of the Najd district, which constituted the mainstay of Ibn
Saud's power, the Guard is considered to be loyal to the royal house
and has been given the primary mission of preserving internal secur-
218
lty. Preserving internal security means, among other things,
protecting the throne from insurgency arising from the regular mili-
tary. Although relatively small in size, the National Guard has
served as a significant counterweight to the regular forces since
military modernization began under King Faisal.
The modernization of the regular armed forces was a calcu-
lated risk for the Saudi government. Their primary mission being
219
protection of the country from external attack, it was vital they
be capable of repelling a modern armed force, but the government was
also aware of the revolutionary potential of a modern military
establishment. Faced with the militant opposition of non-traditional
Arab ideologies of Egypt and Iraq, the Saudis embarked on the expan-
sion and modernization program outlined earlier in this paper. At
the beginning of the program the capability of the two forces was
220
roughly equal in terms of manpower and equipment, but as the army
absorbed the new technology a severe imbalance was created, necessi-
tating a modernization of the National Guard which was begun in 1973
(Table 3)
.
One of the key factors in maintaining control of the armed
forces is keeping the loyalty of the officer corps. For good reason
the Saudi government considered the loyalty of the regular officers
somewhat suspect. It was remembered that during the Civil War in

60
Yemen nine air force pilots defected with their planes to Nasser's
221
forces, necessitating the grounding of the entire air force. To
cause further distrust, many young officers were implicated in the
violent activities of the underground group called the Union of the
Arab Peninsula in 1966 and early 1967. These officers were arrested,
but as modernization continued and the demand for better-educated
officers grew, the government was forced to replace them with indi-
222
viduals whose loyalty to the house of Saud was no less suspect.
Two well-informed observers of Gulf affairs have suggested that the
Government attempted to co-opt the regular officers by satisfying
their professional desire for advanced weaponry and by offering
223
liberal terms of service. Just as these measures did not work
for General Nuri in monarchial Iraq, they have not worked in Saudi
Arabia. By 1969, opposition to the Saudi government was fairly
widespread in the armed forces, as evidenced by the arrests which
followed two abortive coups in June and September. In addition to
the younger officers and civilian intellectuals who took part in a
conspiracy against the monarchy, a number of senior officers filling
key defense positions were also involved. Among those arrested were
the director of the air force academy, a former Chief of Staff of
the regular army, senior officers of the ministries of defense,
224
interior and aviation, and the commanders of military garrisons.
The scope of the organization which planned the coups, reported to
have included cells in all the major towns of the country, led to
225
several hundred arrests. Despite this crackdown there were
reports of another plot in early 1970, and still another was un-
O O £.
covered in 1972. In October 1974, several National Guard off:
cers suspected of plotting against the regime were arrested,
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indicating that discontent was spreading even to those forces con-
227
sidered most loyal to the royal house
,
Although the Saudi government has been successful in keeping
the lid on the political system, the number of plots that have been
uncovered in the last decade and the level of military participation
in them does not bode well for the future. The bulk of the military
228
is still considered to be loyal to the crown, but how long it will
remain so is at least open to question. As the technical complexity
of the armed forces increases, the number of progressive, technically-
oriented officers in key military positions will likewise increase.
If the Saudi government, even with its vast development plans, fails
to satisfy the inner needs of men like these, the days of the Saudi
monarchy will be numbered. With the 1969 coup attempts as prece-
dents, it is not difficult to conceive of a broad underground
organization using the developing military capability to bring down




At the beginning of this paper it was pointed out that Iran
and Iraq had amicably settled their long-standing dispute over the
Shatt-al-Arab . Subsequently the two governments were talking about
a regional security structure to eliminate foreign military alliance
and interference, raising hopes among observers for the ultimate
security of the region. Although such a structure would be highly
desirable and could serve to alter significantly the patterns of the
use of military power developed in this paper, it has yet to be
created. Iraq has not been living up to the spirit of its agreements
with Iran and the Arab Gulf states have been reluctant to support the
pact because it would formally recognize Iran's predominant position
229
in the Gulf. Without their concurrence and the full support of
Iraq, a Gulf security pact cannot be formed, let alone be maintained.
Unless such an arrangement can be concluded, the political future
of the Persian Gulf is uncertain.
As can be seen from Table 4, the 1976 balance of military
capability rests with Iran, but since the Irano-Iraqi arms race is
continuing, this may change in the future. Whatever arms agreement
has been signed between Iraq and the Soviet Union, it can be viewed
as evidence of this continuing arms race. If the Iranian press
reports are to be believed, Iran now considers Iraq more of a threat




Iranian perception is that Iraq will receive strong Soviet support
2 30
for future territorial claims against Persian Gulf states. The
Iraqi-Irano goodwill of the spring of 1975 had deteriorated into
distrust and suspicion by the fall of 1976.
Since the 1975 agreement, the Iranians have been given some
valid reasons to distrust the Iraqi intentions. During 1976 Iraq
had been supporting radical elements in South Yemen and the lower
Gulf states which have been making serious efforts to undermine the
.
231
stability of the regimes in Oman, Kuwait and Bahrain. The agita-
tion of these elements played a major role in the Kuwaiti govern-
232
ment's decision to dissolve the Parliament which, as discussed
above, was the stated reason for the recent Iraqi incursion into
Kuwaiti territory. The Iranian response to the territorial infringe-
ment has been less than in 1973, probably because of the attitude
of the Kuwaitis and the support they have received from other Arab
states. A more serious attempt by Iraq to unilaterally delineate
its border with Kuwait will probably create broad Arab support for
Kuwait, making Iranian intervention unnecessary. If, however, strong
Arab military support does not materialize, as in the case of Oman,
Iranian military involvement is almost a certainty. The Shah has
publicly stated that Iran will not tolerate a seizure of Kuwait by
233
Iraq.
The Shah's policy can be extended beyond Kuwait. If any
traditional Gulf government is seriously threatened by left-wing
forces, a strong Iranian response can be expected. The Arab dis-
trust of Iran is overshadowed by the desire of conservative Arab
rulers to remain in power, as can be seen from the Omani request
234
for Iranian military aid to fight the Dhofar rebels. In keeping
with its role as self-appointed guarantor of Gulf stability, Iran's
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response would, if required, include military action. Although it
is probable that the threatened government would request, or at
least accede to offered Iranian military assistance, the possibility
that Iran would intervene without permission must be considered,
Another possible scenario for the use of the Iranian mili-
tary capability in Gulf politics is that if domestic support for the
Shah deteriorates sufficiently, he could use an external military
venture to build up his popularity. It has been reported that one
of the real motives behind the 1971 seizure of the Gulf islands was
the Shah's desire to restore his sagging prestige after failing to
press the Iranian claim to Bahrain and to "enhance his image as a
235
forceful and decisive monarch." Whether or not the report is
true is beside the point. The Shah would not be the first leader
in history to make such an attempt, and such a situation is cer-
tainly conceivable.
For their part, the Saudis will probably continue to play
a relatively minor military role in Gulf affairs for the next few
years. The resources required for the execution of their monumental
$100 billion second economic development plan should preoccupy the
Saudis internally. However, if the above scenario of a traditional
government in trouble is played out, it can be expected that Saudi
Arabia will play a significant role. Although they are rapidly
acquiring a large military capability, the severe Saudi manpower
problems discussed above could limit the employment of the capabil-
ity. This limitation could restrict the Saudi military response to
the scenario, but, if the Saudis resort again to hiring mercenaries,
their burgeoning capability could be employed effectively.
The x-factor in Persian Gulf power politics is the domestic
stability of the major governments. Each state faces potential
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opposition from within its military establishment and the stability
of the entire region may well depend upon how one government con-
trols these future challenges. If Iraq's Ba 'athist/military govern-
ment were to fall, it would probably merely result in a change of
personalities, not of ideology. On the other hand, the fall of
either the Iranian or Saudi Arabian government could presage a major
shift in the regional balance of power. The fall of either might
also precipitate a collapse of the other which would place great
pressure for change on the smaller states of the Gulf.
The future of the Persian Gulf is tenuous, at best. The key
difference between the existing situation and that of the recent
past is the size and complexity of the arsenals which have been
accumulated. On all sides the weapons are so powerful and the dis-
tances to potential targets so short, that a minor diplomatic tension
not handled properly could rapidly become a major conflagration.
With the military capabilities increasing almost daily, it is diffi-
cult, if not impossible, to control indefinitely all of the forces
involved. Yet, unless just such control is maintained the possibil-
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* - Degree of uncertainty
AA - Anti-aircraft
AAM - Air to air missile
AC - Armoured car
A/C - Aircraft
AF - Air force
AFV - Armoured fighting vehicle
APC - Amoured personnel carrier
AS - Air superiority
ASM - Air to surface missile
ASW - Anti-submarine warfare




CR - Combat radius
Div - Division
FB - Fighter bomber
+ - More than this number
GA - Ground attack




MAP - Military Aid Program
MR - Multi-role
NM - Nauticle mile
psgr - passenger
recon - Reconnaissance
SAM - Surface to air missile
SS - Supersonic
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RELATIVE CAPABILITIES OF MAJOR AIRCRAFT
IN THE PERSIAN GULF
U.S.
F-86 Korean War era subsonic jet fighter, armed with
six 12,7 mm guns and can carry bombs or air-to-
ground rockets. Roughly equivalent to Soviet
MIG-17.
F-5 Lightweight tactical fighter designed and built
by Northrup Corporation for export to U.S. allies.
Designed for relatively simple maintenance, but
is capable of various combat roles including
reconnaissance. Mach 1.4 speed, carries 20 mm
cannon, Sidewinder AAM, and/or a bomb, rocket or
ASM load up to a maximum load of 6200 lbs,*3
Capabilities roughly equivalent to MIG-21.
F-4 Mach 2+ two-seat, long range, all-weather inter-
ceptor and attack bomber. Designed as front line
U.S. fighter. Carries six AAM and/or alternative
loads of bombs, rockets, or ASMs to a maximum
combat load of 16,000 lbs. c Key to effectiveness
is the man in the second seat who operates the
installed target acquisition radars, associated
fire-control computers and the armament." Capa-
bilities roughly equivalent to MIG-23.
F-14 Mach 2+, two-seat, multi-role variable-geometry
wing aircraft. Designed for air-to-air combat
superiority and broad area air defense. Armed
with multi-barrel 20 mm cannon, Pheonix/Sparrow/
Sidewinder AAM, and various combinations of bombs/
missiles to a maximum external load of 14,500 lbs.
Aircraft has a unique capability to engage several




with F-4, the key to its effectiveness is the man
in the second seat who performs the same functions
as in the F-4, No currently known Soviet equiva-
lent in capability, due to target engagability
factor.
F-15 Mach 2.5+, air superiority, single-seat, long-
range fighter aircraft. Possesses secondary, but
effective, air-to-ground mission. Armament
includes 20mm multi-barrel cannon, variety of
short and medium range AAM (Sidewinder/Sparrow)
and maximum external bomb/rocket/missile load of
15,000 lbs. Capabilities roughly equivalent to
MIG-25; however, MIG-25's speed advantage is
significant.
F-16 Mach 2+, single-seat, lightweight/air-combat
fighter. To become major NATO fighter by replac-
ing older F-104's. Armament includes 20mm multi-
barrel cannon, Sidewinder AAM, and bombs/rockets/
ASM's up to a maximum load of 11,000 to 15,200 lbs.,
gdepending upon fuel load. Soviet equivalent
unknown.
F-18 Mach 1.8+, low-cost, lightweight, multi-mission,
single-seat, aircraft designed to replace the F-4
on missions of fighter escort and interdiction.
Armament includes 20mm multi-barrel cannon, Side-
winder/Sparrow AAM, and mixed external ordnance to
a maximum load in excess of 13,000 lbs. Soviet
equivalent unknown.
A-10 Subsonic, advanced close-support aircraft.
Designed to provide maximum air support for ground
forces. Armament includes 30mm seven barrel cannon,
and maximum external bomb/rocket/ASM load of 16,000





MIG-17 Korean War era, subsonic jet fighter. Armament
includes 23mm/37mm cannons, air-to-air rockets and
bombs. Roughly equivalent to F-86.
MIG-19 Mach 1.4, mid-1950' s jet fighter. Armament
includes 23mm/37mm cannons, AAM and air-to-
k
rockets, Roughly equivalent to U.S. F-100
MIG-21 Mach 2, single-seat, short range jet fighter.
Armament includes 30mm cannon and AAM. Later
versions increased armament to improve air-to-
ground capability. Roughly equivalent to F-5 and
F-104.
TU-16 Subsonic, long range heavy bomber. Armament con-
sists of six or seven separate 20mm gun stations.
Maximum bomb load 19,800 lbs. Roughly equivalent
to B-52.
SU-7 Mach 1,6, single-seat, ground-attack fighter.
Armament includes 30mm cannon, and external bombs/
rockets, normally totaling 25000 lbs. Rough U.S.
equivalent unknown.
MIG-23 Mach 2.3, single-seat, variable-geometry wing tac-
tical fighter. A two-seat combat version is in use,
Armament includes a twin barrel 23mm cannon, AAM
and external weapons of unknown type. Roughly
equivalent to F-4.
TU-22 Mach 1.4 long-range bomber. Weapons load believed
pto be less than TU-16. Roughly equivalent to U.S.
B-58.
MIG-25 Mach 3.2, medium range, single-seat fighter. Due
to altitude capability (80,000 ft.), also used in
reconnaisance role. Known to carry advanced AAM,
qhowever, other armament unknown. Roughly equiva-
lent to F-15, however, speed advantage is signifi-
cant. F-14 with Phoenix missile considered to be





Jet Provost Subsonic, medium range, light, two-seat airplane.
Designed as jet fighter; however, has primary
ground attack role. Armament includes .303 inch
machine gun and external loads of .50 inch guns,
r
rockets , bombs in small amounts.
BAC 145 Basically an improved Jet Provost aircraft with a




Subsonic, long-range, single-seat gound attack jet
fighter. MK 66 is a two-seat version. Armament
includes 30mm Aden guns and 7,000+ lbs. of external
s
ordinance including bombs and rockets.
Mach 2+ , single-seat, all weather interceptor.
Armament includes 30mm Aden guns, AAM and air-to-
air rockets. Roughly equivalent to F-5 in capa-
bility.
FRANCE
Mirage III Mach 2+, high altitude, single-seat, all weather
interceptor with a secondary ground support role.
Armament includes 30mm cannon and AAM. Ground
attack armament includes two 1000 lb. bombs or
u
rockets. Roughly equivalent to F-104.
Mirage V Ground attack aircraft derived from Mirage III.
Same basic plane with improved fuel capacity and
greater ordnance load. Maximum ordnance load in
excess of 8000 lbs. including bombs, rockets and
v
air-to-surface missiles.
a. Jane's Aircraft 1955-56, p. 297





cL Personal interview with senior grade U.S. naval aviator
who wished to remain anonymous, September 22, 1976,
e. Jane's Aircraft 1975-76
, p. 349.
f. Ibid., pp, 387-388.
g. Ibid., pp. 341-343,
h. Ibid., pp. 396-397.
i. Ibid., pp. 332-333.




1. Jane's Aircraft 1965-66
, pp, 328-329.
m, Jane's Aircraft 1975-76
, pp, 511-512,
n. Ibid., p. 508.
o. Ibid., pp. 499-500.
p. Ibid., pp, 514-515.
q. Ibid., pp. 500-501,
r. Jane's Aircraft 1965-66
, p. 131.
s. Jane's Aircraft 1964-65
, pp. 152-153.
t. Jane's Aircraft 1965-66
, pp. 133-134.
u. Ibid., p. 39.
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